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INTRODUCTION 
I am grateful to Phil Weiser and the Silicon Flatirons Center for the 
opportunity to discuss the role of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
in the formulation of public policy for the Internet. I approach the topic 
in a somewhat awkward position. At the time of this conference, my 
*  Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, and Professor, George Washington 
University Law School (on leave). From March 2008 to March 2009, the author served as 
Chairman of the FTC. The views expressed here are the author’s alone. 
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tenure as the FTC’s chairman is the equivalent of an hour-to-hour lease, 
terminable at will. My wife and I recently visited a bank to purchase a 
certificate of deposit. To perform a required background check, the 
bank’s representative asked, “Where do you work?” I said I was with the 
Federal Trade Commission. The next question was, “What is your 
position there?” The first answer that came to my mind was “precarious.”  
The imminent close of my time as FTC chairman means that I am 
less able to speak confidently about what the agency will do in the 
months and years ahead. Compared to other Commission members, the 
FTC chairman has relatively greater ability to guide the agency toward 
specific ends. Rather than focus upon specific policy initiatives, I will talk 
more about what I see to be institutional predicates for the FTC to 
formulate sound competition and consumer protection policies for the 
Internet.  
I. THE FTC’S POLICY PORTFOLIO AND THE INTERNET 
The FTC has a fairly extraordinary portfolio of policymaking 
responsibilities that affect the development of the Internet. Three areas 
stand out. First, the Commission is a competition policy agency. As 
such, it addresses a wide range of competition issues, including abuse of 
dominance, mergers, distribution practices, and agreements among rivals. 
It is the Commission’s view, in light of Brand X,1 that the agency has 
jurisdiction to address broadband-related matters, notwithstanding the 
common carrier exception to the Federal Trade Commission Act.2 The 
second element of the FTC’s policy portfolio is consumer protection. 
Over the past decade, the Commission had addressed a wide range of 
issues associated with advertising, marketing, and other activities that 
affect Internet-based commerce. A third area closely related to consumer 
protection is the field of privacy and data protection. 
Two common characteristics link all three dimensions of the FTC’s 
Internet portfolio. The first is the Commission’s method of 
policymaking. To build a program, the FTC has used the complete 
portfolio of policymaking instruments entrusted to it. These include the 
prosecution of cases, the preparation of studies, the education of 
consumers and business organizations, the issuance of guidelines, and 
advocacy with other public institutions. This strategy reflects the agency’s 
 1. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
See also Reconsidering Our Communications Laws: Ensuring Competition and Innovation: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 202 (2006) (prepared statement of the 
Federal Trade Comm’n) [hereinafter Communications Competition Hearing] (discussing FTC 
jurisdiction over broadband services), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/06/ 
P052103CommissionTestimonyReBroadbandInternetAccessServices06142006Senate.pdf. 
 2. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1994). 
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awareness that the application of a wide range of tools often affords the 
best way to achieve good policy results. The search for the optimal mix of 
techniques continues each day, and a commitment to a process of 
experimentation, assessment, and refinement will help ensure that the 
FTC makes wise choices in the face of dramatic technological and 
organizational change associated with electronic commerce.  
The second unifying characteristic is institutional multiplicity. For 
competition policy, consumer protection, and privacy, the FTC shares 
authority with a host of other public bodies. These include other federal 
agencies, state and local governments, and authorities located in other 
countries. The fact of multiplicity creates a special urgency for the FTC 
and its government counterparts to establish means of cooperation to 
address phenomena whose effective treatment requires concerted efforts 
across jurisdictional boundaries. Especially in the international arena, 
there is a need to engage other jurisdictions in discussions about the 
appropriate content of policy, the identification of superior processes for 
implementation, and the attainment of interoperability across nations 
with dissimilar laws and institutional frameworks.  
In dealing with institutional multiplicity, one initially might assume 
that, because the actors are public institutions, they would recognize their 
common cause and tend naturally to work well together to achieve good 
policy results in areas of shared interests. Since leaving the academic 
tower of ivory in 2001 to see theory meet practice at the FTC, one of the 
greatest elements of my continuing education has been to see that 
cooperation across public institutions with overlapping authority rarely 
comes easily. As I discuss in more detail below, in the field of Internet 
commerce and other areas of policy, it will be useful for the United States 
to consider how existing institutional arrangements might be 
reconfigured. 
II. ACHIEVING SUPERIOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: THE 
IMPORTANCE OF LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS IN CAPABILITY 
A central foundation for my views about future FTC policymaking 
for the Internet is a self-assessment exercise that the agency carried out 
in the second half of 2008.3 A major motivation to undertake a self-study 
is a global pattern of exceptional institutional innovation and upheaval 
among agencies that do competition policy and consumer protection 
work. Called The FTC at 100, the FTC self-study had three dimensions. 
We conducted internal assessments, we held roundtables with a variety 
 3. BILL KOVACIC, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR 2ND 
CENTURY (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/workshops/ftc100/docs/ 
ftc100rpt.pdf. 
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of observers in the United States, and we had extensive public 
consultations abroad. The exercise benchmarked the Commission with 
many of its foreign counterparts. With respect to various questions of 
agency organization and governance, it had become evident to me that 
many jurisdictions were looking more energetically than the FTC was at 
fundamental questions of how best to configure the mechanisms for 
carrying out regulatory responsibilities for the Internet and other areas of 
commerce. One of the most interesting sources of institutional 
innovation and reform consists of jurisdictions with a recent past of 
centralized economic control and whose competition and consumer 
protection systems are relatively new. Many of these jurisdictions started 
the process of building new competition policy and consumer protection 
frameworks without the path dependency and preconceptions that tend 
to beset older systems and limit their capacity to embrace innovations. 
The newer regimes ask important, basic questions about regulatory 
design and governance that older regimes might view as asked and 
answered.  
As regulatory frameworks grow older, it can require a significant 
exogenous shock to stimulate change. The financial crisis may have 
provided the shock that stimulates a rethink of the existing distribution 
of financial services regulatory authority.4 Numerous public bodies at the 
state and federal level—including the Federal Reserve Board, the 
Department of the Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the FTC—share 
responsibility for regulating the financial services sector. The FTC has 
seen firsthand the costs of the existing fragmentation of regulatory power 
and has spent an unfortunately large amount of its effort to determine 
the shape of existing jurisdictional boundaries.  
The reassessment of financial services regulation eventually could 
lead legislators and other policymakers to ask questions about the 
wisdom of other regulatory frameworks that feature considerable 
fragmentation and shared authority. One question of keen interest to the 
FTC is whether the country should sustain two federal competition 
agencies, or have numerous public bodies at the federal and state levels 
share responsibility for evaluating the likely competitive effects of 
mergers involving firms in sectors such as energy and 
telecommunications. It is easy to assume that the existing distribution of 
authority is immutable, because congressional committees are unlikely to 
 4. One element of these reforms is a proposal to divest the FTC of its consumer 
protection duties in the field of financial services and create a new Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency. This measure is examined in William E. Kovacic, The Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency and the Hazards of Regulatory Restructuring, LOMBARD STREET, Sept. 14, 
2009, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/090914hazzrdsrestructuring.pdf. 
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surrender the power and electoral benefits that come from overseeing 
specific regulatory agencies. Few committees will give up oversight 
responsibilities without getting something equivalent in trade. The 
financial crisis could upset assumptions about the durability of the status 
quo and raise basic questions about what the optimal regulatory 
framework for other areas of government policy—such as antitrust 
enforcement—might be.  
The financial crisis had not emerged fully when I became FTC 
Chairman in late March 2008. Looking at the months ahead, I asked 
myself what I could do during a tenure that was likely to be relatively 
short. Having studied the experience of appointments to the FTC,5 I 
knew one thing with great clarity: new presidents, whatever their party 
affiliation, tend to pick their own person to chair the Commission. With 
one exception since 1950 at the FTC, all new presidents with a vacancy 
on the Commission have brought in a new person from the outside. I 
understood that my expiry date would probably be about the 20th of 
January, 2009 and that my best-if-used-by date would be November 4, 
2008. For me the question was, “What can you do in a year or less?” As a 
creature of habit from academia, I thought the FTC could do what 
universities do to prepare for review by an accrediting body: conduct a 
self-study. For a number of years I have believed that the FTC urgently 
needed a self-assessment to face the host of challenges coming the 
Commission’s way. This belief drew force from watching one jurisdiction 
after another overseas ask basic questions about institutional design and 
effectiveness. 
Careful attention to institutional considerations is long overdue. 
The overwhelming focus of discussion about regulation is the substance 
of policy rather than the means by which policy is developed and 
implemented. The physics of substantive policy routinely eclipses the 
engineering of implementation. The physics of regulation consists of 
intriguing questions of doctrine and its supporting conceptual 
framework. The papers deemed most publishable in academic journals 
dwell principally upon matters of theory. To affect policy, theory cannot 
be suspended in air. If theory is not grounded in the engineering of 
effective institutions, it will not work in practice. The engineering of 
policy making involves basic questions of implementation. It is one thing 
for the policymaking aerodynamicist to conceive a new variety of aircraft. 
It is another for the policy engineer to design and build it. 
To have elegant physics without excellent engineering is a formula 
for policy failure. A problem with public administration in the United 
 5. On the history of appointments to the FTC from 1914 through the mid-1990s, see 
William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the Federal Trade 
Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 915 (1997). 
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States is that incumbent political leaders in regulatory agencies have too 
few incentives to invest in the engineering of institution building and 
implementation, which are the agencies’ equivalent of durable 
infrastructure. There is strong incentive to engage in consumption and 
too little motivation to invest. In regulatory policymaking, consumption 
consists of engaging in activities that generate readily observable events 
for which one can claim credit. This can imbue policymaking with a 
highly short-term perspective. By contrast, investments in creating a 
strong institutional infrastructure generate returns that tend to extend 
mainly beyond the period of leadership of an individual political 
appointee, of which I am one. Given the choice between consumption 
and investment, the interior voice that urges incumbent leaders to 
consume easily can drown out the voice that calls for investment. Where 
there are long term policy needs and short term political appointees, it is 
a major challenge to create incentives that press the agency to examine its 
institutional arrangements regularly and pursue measures to improve 
them. 
The need to focus on institutional arrangements and effectiveness 
assumes still greater importance for agencies, such as the FTC, that 
operate in highly dynamic environments characterized by rapid change in 
technology, business organization, and patterns of commerce at home 
and abroad. These forms of dynamism demand routine upgrades and 
experiments in the regulatory framework. The upgrades in the regulatory 
policy framework must take place on a recurring basis. A central 
characteristic of good regulatory design and performance involving the 
Internet is a norm that emphasizes continuous improvement. This 
includes identifying relevant commercial phenomena on a regular basis, 
upgrading the knowledge base of the agency on a routine basis, and 
always asking questions about what the appropriate institutional design 
should be. On the scorecard by which we measure the quality of 
regulatory agency decision making, if we ask what constitutes good 
agency leadership, a vital criterion is the demonstrated capacity of the 
regulatory authority to account for new commercial, political, and social 
phenomena and to adapt the agency to address them. 
A positive modern trend among the world’s competition and 
consumer protection authorities is a growing recognition that skill in 
implementation and the quality of institutional arrangements shape 
policy results. Instead of conferences that dwell exclusively upon the big 
issues of substance—what is the right standard for abusive dominance, 
what does net neutrality mean, and how might its specific operational 
criteria be designed—there is more discussion about the proper design of 
regulatory frameworks and how regulatory agencies can make things 
work effectively in practice. There is a very healthy inclination to elevate 
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questions about how to set priorities, how to structure operations, how to 
recruit and retain a capable professional staff, and how to measure 
effectiveness. This is producing a better balance between deliberations 
about questions of normative principles of policy on the one hand and 
matters of institutional infrastructure and management on the other.  
Greater appreciation for the importance of institutional design and 
policy implementation may have the useful effect of spurring a 
redefinition of what constitutes a “good” regulatory agency. In scholarly 
papers and in casual conversation, students of regulation often discuss 
how well agencies are doing. There is no readily observable index by 
which one can see how the shares of the Federal Trade Commission or 
other regulatory bodies are trading. What do we mean when we say that 
a regulatory body is performing well, adequately, or deficiently? On my 
report card, a good agency consciously devotes effort to improving its 
institutional infrastructure. This requires capital investments in 
institutional capacity, a commitment that collides with the short-term 
orientation of much policymaking. An aphorism urged upon 
Washington officials is “to pick the low hanging fruit.” This summons 
up images of fruit gatherers roaming about the Mall with baskets in 
search of easily reached tree limbs. Washington does not have a good 
aphorism that says it is the duty of agency leaders to plant trees. The 
trees of good policy can take years to grow, and the maturation process 
easily can outrun the tenure of the political appointee who will serve two, 
three, or four years. A policymaking culture that emphasizes short-term 
credit-claiming regards one who would plant trees as a fool. The 
consequence is an underinvestment in the kinds of capital improvements 
that improve agency performance over time. 
One cannot readily design binding commands that compel leaders 
to make capital investments in agency capacity. A sustained commitment 
to institution-building arises instead from the establishment of norms 
(inside and outside the agency) that treat enhancements to institutional 
infrastructure and agency capacity as an essential duty of leadership. Such 
a norm presses regulators to describe in each budget cycle what steps the 
agency is taking today to make it a better institution five and ten years 
into the future.  
III. THE FTC AT 100: CHARACTERISTICS OF GOOD AGENCY 
PRACTICE  
The FTC self-study shed light upon a number of approaches that 
the Commission should take to strengthen the agency’s institutional 
foundation and to improve its capacity to deliver good policy results. 
Sketched below are techniques that characterize good agency practice. 
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A. Clear Statement of Goals 
One necessary foundation for effective agency performance is a clear 
definition of the agency’s aims. Everything an agency does flows from 
the development of a clear statement of what the agency is about and 
what it means to do. It is a great challenge for any new set of leaders to 
state their aims clearly and to persuade the agency’s staff that the stated 
aims are worth pursuing. The agency’s administrative and professional 
staff have heard a sequence of political appointees offer their vision for 
the future. They are familiar with a wide array of slogans, clichés, and 
motivational techniques. The staff has heard them all. With each new 
group of political appointees, the staff seeks to learn the new vocabulary 
and re-flag existing projects to please the new regime. It is no small 
matter to overcome fears that each collection of new leaders takes some 
comfort from knowing they will not fully internalize the effects of 
choices taken during their tenure. It requires considerable effort to make 
a credible commitment to build durable norms and to identify goals that 
serve the public and the institution well over time. 
The formulation and statement of goals have two elements. One is 
internal discussion, and the other is external consultation with academics, 
consumers, business officials, and other public officials. The statement of 
goals is not a one-shot endeavor. The agency’s aims required 
reexamination and reformulation as conditions change. The clear 
statement and restatement of aims have a number of important 
advantages. They provide valuable guidance to the agency’s staff, and 
they help affected firms organize their affairs to satisfy their obligations 
under the law. They facilitate debate over what the agency ought to be 
trying to achieve, and they set a baseline for measuring the results of the 
agency’s activities. Maybe most importantly, the exercise of preparing a 
clear statement of aims forces the agency to define its purpose and to 
decide, among all of the choices available to it, what goals most warrant 
its attention.  
B. Process to Set a Strategy 
Good agencies have a conscious plan to set strategy. No 
responsibility of agency leadership is more important. When the FTC 
conducted interviews with other regulators for its self-study, it was 
striking to see how the tyranny of the daily routine tends to discourage 
planning and the forward-looking establishment of priorities. One head 
of a foreign competition agency said, “I’m so busy that I have no time to 
think, much less to plan.” Many agencies operate with what might be 
called a fire department model of prioritization. The fire bell rings. The 
agency takes out the trucks, puts out the fire, returns to the station, and 
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waits for the bell to ring again. In this model, nobody has time to think 
about fire prevention—to determine what causes fires and to figure out 
how best to stop them from happening in the first place.  
A good process of setting strategy forces the agency to consider 
which outlays of resources yield the best returns. The United Kingdom’s 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has one of the best management 
approaches for measuring proposed projects according to their likely 
economic effects or their contribution to the development of doctrine. 
The OFT planning process compares anticipated returns of a project to 
its likely cost in staff and time. Project teams also are asked to provide 
practical tests by which the agency can tell whether expected gains are 
being realized in practice. OFT clearly communicates its planning 
framework to its staff and requires staff to relate proposed projects to the 
framework. 
OFT takes individual projects and considers them as elements of an 
agency-wide portfolio. Individual matters are classified according to their 
likely risks and returns. Some matters pose relatively low risks and 
promise relatively small returns. Some present modest risks and offer 
modest returns. Others entail high risks but, if successful, are likely to 
generate substantial returns. By examining projects as parts of a portfolio, 
OFT is able to assess whether its program is balanced in two respects. It 
helps the agency assess whether its commitments are well matched to its 
capabilities to perform successfully, and it supplies a useful means of 
seeing whether the agency is taking acceptable political risks. In selecting 
projects, an agency can envision itself as either accumulating political 
capital or spending it. An agency can afford to incur deficits in political 
capital temporarily, but not chronically. If an agency runs deficits in 
political capital consistently over time, it will melt down and fail. 
Proposed projects must be measured by their impact upon the political 
capital account. 
Strategic planning assumes special importance in the current 
context. The financial crisis has created enormous pressure to reduce 
public expenditures and to make wise choices among possible application 
of agency funds. The FTC is responsible for enforcing approximately 
fifty-five statutes. To do this the agency receives an annual appropriation 
of roughly $255 million, which supports the work of 1100 employees. 
The imperative to select good projects increases with the possibility that 
federal regulators in the years ahead will do well to protect existing 
budgets or, perhaps, obtain small increases. There is no surplus of 
capacity to cope with improvident program decisions that entail 
commitments which outrun our capabilities to deliver good results. Now 
more than ever a competition agency cannot rely on path dependence—a 
simple repetition of past patterns of behavior—to decide what it will do. 
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C. From Case-Centrism to Effective Problem Solving 
The FTC self-study revealed a healthy movement on the part of 
many competition authorities from a case-centric approach to resource 
allocation toward a philosophy that emphasizes problem solving. The 
traditional focus of project selection has responded to the way in which 
many regulators bodies are evaluated. To a large degree, the popular 
measure of a competition agency is the number of cases it prosecutes: you 
are whom you sue. The commencement of a case is a readily measurable 
event, and cases often serve as a proxy for the more meaningful and 
difficult exercise of determining whether the agency’s programs are 
improving economic performance. In a case-centric measurement 
scheme, there often is extra credit for the big case that gets prominent 
media coverage.  
There are serious problems with a norm that treats the number of 
prosecutorial events as the chief index of an agency’s worth. The agency 
can become the equivalent of an airline that measures effectiveness by its 
number of takeoffs. At the agency’s airport, an observer would see a large 
display board labeled “Departures.” If the observer asked, “Where is the 
board for arrivals?,” the agency would reply, “We do not track arrivals. 
Instead, look at our impressive number of departures.” For purposes of 
good public policy, one needs to monitor arrivals carefully. Are projects 
arriving on time? Are projects taking the agency where it is supposed to 
be going? Did the agency set out on a case with a clear idea of where it 
was going—the difference between departing Washington, D.C. and 
saying “Fly to Los Angeles” versus saying “Fly to the West Coast?”  
An indifference to how projects come to earth—smooth 
touchdowns, hard landings, or smash-ups?—can afflict leaders with 
relatively short-term appointments if the agency is graded by the number 
of cases it initiates. If the policymaking world and the community of 
academics, consumer groups, and practitioners measure the agency and 
its leaders by the number of cases launched, agency leaders may be 
induced to give them what they want. This is a terribly short-sighted 
structure of incentives.  
The FTC self-study identified an emerging, superior view about 
how agencies should approach the application of their authority. The 
appropriate measure of an agency’s value is how well it solves 
competition policy problems, not merely how many cases it prosecutes. A 
problem-solving orientation asks two basic questions about each problem 
the agency faces. The first is to ask what is the best policymaking tool or 
collection of tools to address the problem. The best problem-solving 
approach may often involve a mix of techniques. In the case of serious 
fraud involving electronic commerce, it has become increasingly evident 
that the FTC’s approach must draw upon several of its policy 
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instruments. One element is to assist executive branch prosecutors to 
bring criminal suits to imprison wrongdoers. A second ingredient is to 
develop education programs that encourage consumers to take stronger 
precautions against Internet-based fraud. A third method is to use the 
Commission’s data collection and other research tools to gain a better 
understanding of how criminal actors formulate and implement illegal 
schemes involving the Internet. 
For other issues that deeply involve the Internet, self-regulation can 
be a further useful supplement to the prosecution of cases and the 
development of research and public education programs. The FTC has 
prepared a further iteration of its Self-Regulation Guidelines for 
Behavioral Marketing.6 The FTC did not issue these Guidelines as a 
comprehensive resolution of issues surrounding the use of online 
behavioral marketing. Instead, the Guidelines are one part of a dialogue 
about behavioral marketing and the latest step in an ongoing 
conversation about how self-regulation might facilitate the achievement 
of sound policy.  
To recognize the value of a problem-solving, rather than a case-
centric, policymaking approach is to see something about what will 
constitute the successful competition or consumer protection agency of 
the future. The successful agency will possess a broad, flexible portfolio 
of tools. The FTC ought to be a central participant in forming policy for 
the Internet and for a wide range of other challenging competition and 
consumer protection issues precisely because Congress has given the 
agency an unusually broad range of policy instruments.  
In a number of key respects, the FTC’s policy tools have no 
equivalent in the United States or abroad. For example, the 
Commission’s Bureau of Economics has over eighty industrial 
organization economists with doctorates. Among other 
accomplishments, this team has done truly superior empirical research on 
many pressing issues of public policy, including recent pathbreaking 
work on mortgage disclosures.7 The Commission also has the distinctive 
capacity to compel firms to provide information for the preparation of 
studies unrelated to the prosecution of individual cases. The application 
of this capacity has enabled the FTC to make significant contributions to 
public understanding of matters such as the food advertising directed 
 6. FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE 
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/ 
p085400behavadreport.pdf. 
 7. JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, BUREAU OF ECON., FEDERAL 
TRADE COMM’N, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL 
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS (June 2007), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/p025505mortgagedisclosurereport.pdf. 
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toward children8 and the interaction between producers of branded 
pharmaceuticals and manufacturers of generic equivalents.9  
A further distinctive FTC capability is the joining up of the 
competition and consumer protection perspectives that are inherent in 
the Commission’s mandate. For a number of matters involving the 
operation of the Internet, it can be valuable to bring both substantive 
disciplines to bear in deciding when and how policymakers should 
intervene. For example, in addressing subjects relating to privacy, the 
FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection’s experience in bringing cases, 
designing regulations, and conducting education programs has generated 
useful insights about the design of privacy protections. The agency’s 
experience as a competition policy authority makes the agency sensitive 
to possibilities for rivalry among firms to elicit private initiative to satisfy 
consumer tastes concerning privacy, and it highlights the need to ensure 
that privacy related rules are not set in a way that endangers practices 
that bring significant benefits to consumers. The mix of competition and 
consumer protection duties creates a healthy dynamic tension inside the 
agency and increases our capacity to see all major dimensions of a 
problem and devise appropriate solutions.  
The FTC has an excellent collection of capabilities to apply a 
sophisticated problem solving approach to difficult issues involving 
Internet commerce. This does not mean that the Commission or the 
larger community of competition policy and consumer protection 
specialists can assume that the agency has achieved an optimal regulatory 
design or that the distribution of regulatory authority in these areas 
across federal, state, and local institutions is ideal. There are many 
questions about the U.S. institutional framework for economic regulation 
that would benefit from debate.  
Developments overseas suggest that one question worth considering 
is whether the results of collective decision making by a multi-member 
commission are superior to those achieved from a regulatory body headed 
by one individual. Many foreign counterparts to the FTC are governed 
by a single official or a team consisting of a chief executive and a chief 
operating officer. That is the configuration of the UK’s Office of Fair 
Trading. The OFT’s leaders are advised by an external board consisting 
of academics, practitioners, consumer representatives, and government 
officials drawn from the United Kingdom and abroad. A potential 
 8. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, MARKETING FOOD TO CHILDREN AND 
ADOLESCENTS: A REVIEW OF INDUSTRY EXPENDITURES, ACTIVITIES, AND SELF-
REGULATION (July 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/07/ 
P064504foodmktingreport.pdf. 
 9. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (July 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/ 
genericdrugstudy.pdf. 
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benefit of having a unitary governance mechanism is an increase of 
accountability. The head of an institution with a unitary governance 
framework may be more likely to internalize the costs and benefits of 
decisions taken during the official’s tenure. The unitary framework also 
eliminates the circumstance in which one member of a governing board 
acts in a manner that diminishes the value of the partnership but 
advances the individual’s interests.  
Comparative experience also raises serious questions about 
procedural conventions governing the operation of the federal multi-
member commissions. The Government in the Sunshine Act,10 for 
example, severely reduces the opportunities for collective discussion and 
consultation that are assumed to be the strengths of decision making by a 
college rather than by a single executive. For a broad range of matters, 
the Sunshine Act forbids a quorum of commission members (for a five 
member body, the quorum is three) from discussing agency business 
without the prior issuance of a public notice that such conversations will 
take place and, in many instances, without making the conversation open 
to the public.  
It is difficult to imagine a measure that is better calculated to 
diminish agency effectiveness than forbidding spontaneous conversations 
among a plurality of members of the board. At the FTC, conversations 
about FTC cases or broader policy issues are permitted if only two 
commissioners participate. For instance, if a third member of the 
commission appears in the cafeteria and joins two colleagues who are 
discussing FTC business over lunch, the conversation about Commission 
work immediately ceases and discourse turns to topics of culture, sport, 
or holiday plans. Consequently, discussions about agency matters take 
place in bilateral conversations between commissioners, with the 
inevitable misinterpretation and loss of meaning that takes place as 
information is relayed in a chain of seriatim encounters, two-by-two, 
among the five. Another accepted circumvention of the Sunshine Act is 
to have the advisors of the commissioners meet as a group to discuss 
what the board’s collective preferences might be. Rather than encourage 
private face-to-face discussions among the five board members, the 
multi-member federal commissions rely heavily on the insane alternative 
of having their staffs collectively and privately perform key functions of 
debate and consensus building.  
When the strictures of the Sunshine Act are explained to the FTC’s 
foreign counterparts, there is an evident disbelief that a nation nominally 
would choose to avail itself of the benefits from collective decision 
making and then proceed to disable, or severely encumber, the process of 
 10. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994). 
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collective discussion that for most tribunals is an essential means by 
which the benefits of governance by college are realized. A rethink of this 
debilitating limitation is an appropriate part of a larger assessment about 
how the FTC and other federal regulatory commissions might improve 
effectiveness. If existing limits on spontaneous private discussions 
involving a plurality of commission members are not relaxed, there is 
considerable merit to abandoning the collective governance model and 
replacing it with a unitary executive.  
D. Effective System of Internal Quality Control 
The FTC self-study underscored the importance of strong quality 
control as an element of good agency practice. Foreign agencies with 
competition and consumer protection responsibilities are using a variety 
of means to test the legal theory and factual support for proposed cases 
and administrative regulations. Some have designated staff to participate 
on “scrutiny panels” or to serve as “devil’s advocates” to test the work of 
the case handling teams. A key focus of these measures is to avoid a 
tendency to underestimate the quality of conceptual arguments and facts 
that an opponent will raise in litigation.  
Beyond attaining an accurate view of an opponent’s likely litigation 
positions, the effort to build robust, internally driven quality control 
techniques is to set policy and process in the right place—to do the right 
things and to do things the right way. The enhancement of internal 
quality control mechanisms reflects an awareness that an agency will not 
achieve good policy results consistently if it relies principally on outsiders 
to come in from time to time and exhort the agency to do this, that, or 
the other thing. External assessments can help guide the design of an 
internal quality control and usefully supplement the agency’s own 
internal measures.11 Yet the urgency to test theories, facts, programs, and 
processes must come foremost from within. 
E. Investments in Building Knowledge 
The most important input to what competition and consumer 
protection agencies do is knowledge. Agencies rise or fall according to 
how well they understand commercial developments and stay attuned to 
 11. An excellent example of this form of external assessment is the framework that Paul 
Malyon and Bernard J. Phillips have developed in recent years under the auspices of a project 
sponsored by the Competition Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Malyon and Phillips have constructed an evaluation tool that assists 
competition authorities to examine their management processes and, based on the results of 
extensive interviews with agency officials and employees and outside observers, to construct an 
action plan for improvements. The competition authorities of Hungary, Mexico, and Portugal 
have participated in this exercise.  
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current thinking in business strategy, economics, law, and public 
administration. The commercial environment that the agencies oversee 
and the intellectual disciplines on which they rely feature high levels of 
dynamism and increasing complexity. A recurring criticism of public 
policy making that involves the Internet and other dynamic commercial 
developments is that the knowledge base of the government agencies is 
the equivalent of a bicycle and the rate of change in the industry 
resembles a Porsche. From this perspective, the agency cyclists struggle 
in vain to catch up. On a good day, they feebly get their arms around 
developments that took place five years ago. Policy is set on the basis of 
stale knowledge, new developments rush onward, and the agency never 
achieves the capacity to addresses current problems effectively.  
A competition policy or consumer protection agency resembles a 
high technology company whose well-being depends upon the quality of 
its research and development programs. Imagine a conversation between 
the executives of a pharmaceutical company and investment analysts. 
Suppose the analysts ask the chief executive to describe the firm’s R&D 
program. What conclusions would the analysts form if the CEO said the 
firm has fired its scientists, shuttered its laboratories, abandoned plans to 
develop new drugs, and chosen to focus solely on turning out its existing 
products as fast as it can? That is a formula for going out of business.  
To cope with change and complexity, the agency must obtain 
regular, substantial additions to its base of knowledge. Without routine 
upgrades, an agency is prone to misdiagnose problems, select harmless or 
perverse cures, or find itself trapped in analytical models that once 
represented the state of the art but have become threadbare. The 
successful agency of the future is one that invests heavily in building 
knowledge and in refreshing its intellectual capital. These investments 
are the public administration equivalent of research and development.12 
These outlays do not occur spontaneously or by accident. Good agency 
practice requires a conscious process of building R&D outlays into every 
budget cycle. Regulators should be pressed to explain what part of their 
budgets are being spent on making their agencies smarter. 
R&D for competition policy and consumer protection can take 
several forms. One method is to convene public consultations in the form 
of hearings or workshops. In these proceedings, an agency asks 
knowledgeable outsiders to share their views about important 
developments in commerce and in academic disciplines central to the 
 12. During his tenure as FTC Chairman from 2001–2004, Timothy Muris underscored 
the need for the FTC and similar institutions to invest in “competition policy research and 
development” and to make these expenditures a routing element of the agency’s budget 
process. Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the Future 
Development of Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359. 
16 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. [Vol. 8 
agency’s work. These proceedings do not necessarily seek to identify 
definitive policy making paths. In many instances, they serve to teach the 
agency what it must know to apply its authority wisely.  
Since the early 1990s, the FTC has made external consultations a 
more central element of its portfolio of activities.13 This reflects the 
Commission’s recognition that the only way for the agency to stay 
current is to use its policy instruments to improve its understanding of 
the commercial and intellectual environment in which it operates. This 
highlights another respect in which case-centric measures of agency 
effectiveness give false signals about what an agency should do. In a case-
centric world, the incentive to make substantial R&D investments goes 
down the drain. In any period, an agency faces the question of how much 
to consume (i.e., bring new cases or issue new rules) and how much to 
invest (e.g., undertaking projects that improve the agency’s base of 
knowledge or its administrative infrastructure and thus increase its 
capacity to select the optimal mix of policy measures). If it embraces 
case-centrism as the measure of its worth, an agency will emphasize 
current consumption and slight investments in capability. 
Another approach to building knowledge is to engage the skills of 
institutions outside the agency. The FTC cannot accumulate the 
capability it needs with its own resources alone. One promising way for 
the FTC to augment its own efforts is to form partnerships with 
academic research centers. In 2008 the agency initiated a prototype with 
Northwestern University, which has a superb complex of researchers in 
business, economics, and law who specialize in topics closely related to 
the FTC’s responsibilities. The FTC program with Northwestern could 
become a platform that the agency can duplicate elsewhere in the United 
States and abroad. One can look forward to a day when the FTC has 
links with institutions such as the Department of Economics at the 
University of Toulouse, the Centre for Competition Policy at the 
University of East Anglia, the faculties of economics and law at Oxford 
University, the London School of Economics, the National University of 
Singapore, and any number of other leading research centers. Through 
partnerships with academic research centers, the FTC can learn about 
state of the art developments in theory and empirical research and, by 
reviewing current Commission initiatives, can seek to encourage 
researchers to study topics related to the agency’s work. To this end, the 
FTC might make greater efforts to make agency data accessible to 
researchers who have an interest in doing applied work related to 
competition law and consumer protection. Without these kinds of 
 13. More Than Law Enforcement: the FTC’s Many Tools—A Conversation with Tim Muris 
& Bob Pitofsky, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 774–80 (2005) (discussing FTC’s expanded use of 
public consultations). 
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collaborations, the FTC and its counterpart agencies overseas are 
unlikely to keep up with the demands that developments in commerce 
and in the intellectual framework of competition and consumer 
protection place upon government authorities to strengthen their pool of 
knowledge. 
F. Recruiting and Retaining Human Capital 
As suggested above, increased cooperation with external institutions 
can help the FTC expand its capabilities and improve its effectiveness. 
Even with these and other forms of collaboration, the public agencies can 
prosper only if they succeed in recruiting and retaining a high quality 
staff. At some point, the United States will have to confront the political 
and social hypocrisy by which its citizens and elected officials demand 
Mercedes-like performance from public institutions and insist on paying 
nothing more than Chevrolet prices to get it. In no area of our 
experience as consumers do we expect there to be no general link 
between the quality of what we are willing to pay and what we get. On 
what basis might one reasonably expect that this relationship is largely or 
completely irrelevant in the field of public administration? 
The current recession has raised the FTC’s personnel retention rates 
and made public service a more attractive career option for many 
individuals. No agency can count on national economic distress to 
preserve and enhance its human capital indefinitely. As economic 
conditions improve, the economic enticements of the private sector again 
will hammer at the fragile structure of civil service compensation 
schemes. Even amid conditions of economic crisis, there are many skills 
necessary to agency effectiveness that cannot be had on the cheap. For 
example, good information technology specialists remain in high 
demand. The FTC and its foreign counterparts depend ever more heavily 
on their communications infrastructure and electronic data sets to 
conduct routine operations and improve productivity. An agency can 
suffer grievously if it does not sustain and enhance its information 
technology systems. How long will a superb information technology 
officer remain with the Commission if the civil service salary ceiling 
remains at about $150,000—or perhaps $20,000 more with a Senior 
Executive Service bonus? 
Public agencies are no different from any number of other 
institutions whose quality of performance is a function of their human 
capital. A major reason for the FTC’s progression from near death in 
196914 and from a severe legislative pummeling in the late 1970s and 
 14. William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of 
Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L. REV. 587, 592–602 (1982) (discussing critical assessments 
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early 1980s15 to a position in the front ranks of the world’s public 
agencies is that the overall quality of its personnel improved dramatically. 
One major enhancement was the development of a larger number of 
highly skilled teams to prepare and litigate the agency’s cases. Despite 
these improvements, the FTC and many other public agencies lack the 
depth of skills that private sector institutions such as law firms can 
assemble. The Commission resembles a sports team with an excellent 
first team and a substantial number of skilled players on the bench. But 
the roster is thinner than one would like in several areas, and the 
departure of certain valued performers could cause a drop off in 
performance. 
The FTC’s position is not unique among competition and 
consumer protection authorities. If one makes the safe assumption that 
salaries for civil servants are not about to rise significantly, agencies will 
have to find novel ways to attract and keep the human talent they need to 
perform effectively. Several strategies come to mind. One way is to give 
agency employees a better experience by devoting extensive attention to 
individual professional development. Another is to cooperate more 
extensively with the academic community to establish internships for 
students, to recruit promising graduates, and to encourage faculty 
members to spend time in the agencies as visiting scholars. If substantial 
turnover is to be an inevitable, chronic condition, the agencies must build 
methods to retain institutional memory and other forms of important 
knowhow when people leave. Agencies can develop an electronic 
repository of research memoranda, checklists used to perform interviews 
and conduct investigations, and other practical tools that can be used by 
others and need not be reconstructed from scratch. Staff can establish 
and maintain data sets that track activity and permit managers and case 
handlers to obtain a clear, accurate profile of what the agency has done 
and to identify the nature and status of existing matters. Many of these 
endeavors require the agency to make regular capital outlays for 
information systems.  
G. Constructing and Improving Networks with Other Institutions 
The FTC self-study underscored a point that many agencies have 
come to realize in the course of working in legal environments where 
many public agencies share responsibility for specific functions. 
Individual initiative will not enable competition and consumer protection 
agencies to carry out their mandates successfully. The performance of 
of FTC issued by Ralph Nader’s consumer organization and by a blue ribbon commission of 
the American Bar Association). 
 15. Id. at 664–71 (describing congressional proposals from late 1970s and early 1980s to 
curtail FTC authority). 
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national competition policy and consumer protection systems will 
degrade over time if agencies do not improve their capacity to cooperate 
effectively with other institutions that have the same or similar mandates.  
A number of foreign jurisdictions are realizing that it can be a 
tremendous source of national economic advantage to improve the design 
of regulatory institutions, either by reordering the assignment of 
regulatory responsibility or by strengthening cooperation among existing 
institutions. This advantage consists of achieving the existing level of 
regulatory performance at a lower cost or improving regulatory results at 
the same cost. If the United States complacently regards the existing 
configuration of competition policy and consumer protection regulatory 
authority as immutable and fails to engage existing institutions in more 
substantial collaborative programs, the nation will fall behind other 
jurisdictions that are experimenting actively with institutional reforms to 
achieve superior policy solutions.  
The present configuration of competition policy authority is a 
striking example of the problem. In recent years, three jurisdictions—
France, Portugal, and Spain—have consolidated their two national 
competition agencies into a single entity. Brazil’s legislature is poised to 
adopt legislation that will consolidate most functions performed by the 
three national bodies with competition policy authority into a single 
institution. These developments ought to be a stimulus for Americans to 
ask whether the existing distribution of policy making and prosecutorial 
power is sensible. What benefits does the country gain from having two 
federal antitrust agencies? Is it sensible for sectoral regulators at the 
national and state levels to conduct reviews of mergers and impose 
conditions that go beyond remedies attained by the federal antitrust 
authorities? Should state governments have competence to enforce the 
national competition laws and conduct proceedings parallel to those 
undertaken by the Department of Justice and the FTC? Is the existing 
form of private rights of action well conceived?  
A closely related question of institutional design is the wisdom of 
maintaining jurisdictional boundaries that were set in the first half of the 
20th century. The FTC has advocated the abandonment of the common 
carrier exception to its jurisdiction to account for the transformation of 
the telecommunications sector in the past forty years.16 The Commission 
has developed substantial expertise in dealing with false advertising and 
the litigation of claims involving unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 
This expertise usefully could be brought to bear upon a range of matters 
 16. See Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 110th Cong. (2008) (prepared statement of the Federal Trade 
Comm’n), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/p034101reauth.pdf; Communications 
Competition Hearing, supra note 1. 
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involving telecommunications services providers, but the common carrier 
exception precludes this.  
If the answer to all of these queries is to leave the status quo in 
place, then it is incumbent upon the public agencies with competition or 
consumer protection duties to spend more effort than they do today to 
achieve a greater convergence of approaches and to see how collaboration 
can permit them to achieve results that exceed the grasp of single 
agencies acting alone. One place to start is to create a domestic 
competition network and a domestic consumer protection network to 
engage the public authorities in the kind of discussions and cooperation 
that U.S. agencies pursue with their foreign counterparts.17 There is no 
forum in which the U.S. public institutions assemble regularly to discuss 
what they do and consider, as a group, how the complex framework of 
federal, state, and local commands might operate more effectively. At 
best, the U.S. public authorities perform these network building 
functions in piecemeal fashion at bar association conferences and other 
professional gatherings. There also are bilateral discussions involving 
some public bodies.18 These measures are useful, but they are not good 
substitutes for the establishment of a more comprehensive framework of 
interagency regulatory cooperation. The U.S. competition agencies spend 
more time seeking to develop effective mechanisms for cooperation with 
foreign authorities than they devote to the integration of policymaking 
across federal and state agencies domestically. 
Good examples of how to achieve greater levels of cooperation exist 
abroad. In the middle of this decade, the European Union (EU) created 
the European Competition Network (ECN) to coordinate the work of 
the national competition authorities of the EU member states and the 
European Commission’s Competition Directorate (DG COMP). The 
ECN meets regularly to discuss matters of common concern and to 
promote information sharing and other forms of cooperation. The 
network has achieved considerable success in avoiding conflicts that 
might have arisen from the EU’s decision to devolve greater levels of 
responsibility to the member states as part of a modernization of the 
EU’s competition policy framework. 
 17. See William E. Kovacic, Toward a Domestic Competition Network, in COMPETITION 
LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 316 (Richard 
A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004) (describing value of establishing a domestic 
competition network). 
 18. These initiatives facilitate discussion about current law enforcement matters and the 
examination of larger policy issues. Since 2006, the FTC and many of the state attorneys 
general have convened an annual workshop to address topics of common interest. The 
workshops have addressed competition and consumer protection issues in the petroleum 
industry, the pharmaceutical industry, and the retailing sector. This recently developed custom 
will continue in the Fall of 2009, when the FTC, DOJ, and the states convene a workshop on 
energy issues.  
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As suggested above, government agencies in the United States 
would do well to emulate the European experience and create domestic 
networks for competition policy and consumer protection, respectively. A 
domestic competition network could begin with a memorandum of 
understanding adopted by the public agencies with competition policy 
duties, including the two federal antitrust agencies, sectoral regulators 
such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the 
antitrust units of the state attorneys general. The agreement might 
commit the participants to participate in regular discussions about 
matters such as the coordination of inquiries involving the same 
transaction or conduct, the development of common analytical standards, 
information sharing about specific cases, staff exchanges, and the 
identification of superior investigative techniques. Cooperation could 
progress toward the pursuit of joint research projects and the preparation 
of a common strategy to address various commercial phenomena. The 
network would be a platform for replicating activities that have become 
core elements of the ECN, such as interagency sharing of practical 
know-how and sector-specific experience, the development of common 
training exercises, and benchmarking of procedures across agencies.  
The same approach could be applied to consumer protection. 
Shared concurrent authority is common for a variety of consumer 
protection matters involving the Internet and other aspects of commerce. 
For the Internet, the consumer protection portfolio is shared by, among 
others, the FCC, the FTC, state attorneys general, and state consumer 
protection offices. Focal points for collaboration within a domestic 
consumer protection network would include the development of 
common analytical techniques, coordination of investigations, and the 
preparation of common research projects.  
H. Communication with External Constituencies  
Effective internal and external communications are key ingredients 
of good agency performance. One dimension of effective 
communications is to communicate the agency’s aims and intentions 
clearly to its own staff and to external audiences. Another element is 
education directed to consumers and to businesses. Consumer and 
business education programs can encourage precaution taking that 
reduces exposure to Internet fraud and spurs greater reporting of episodes 
of apparent misconduct.  
Education programs can build upon what the FTC learns through 
the application of its research and data collection tools. As noted above, 
FTC researchers have done excellent work to examine how individuals 
absorb information and understand disclosures associated with various 
products and services. The work of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics has 
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identified a number of ways in which disclosures involving mortgage 
transactions might be improved to enable consumers to make better 
choices among product alternatives. These efforts supplement the 
agency’s litigation program, which challenges instances of 
misrepresentation and related misconduct involving the sale of financial 
services products. The mix of initiatives—research, consumer education, 
and litigation—is another illustration of the application of a 
multidimensional problem solving approach to address problems the 
FTC has encountered. 
I. Ex Post Evaluation 
A necessary element of the policy life cycle is a conscious process to 
assess whether specific agency initiatives achieved their intended aims. 
There is a great temptation to treat ex post evaluation as a luxury to be 
dispensed with in order to handle the press of new business. It is easier to 
issue a press release that gives assurances about the efficacy of a chosen 
course of action than it is to attempt to measure actual effects. Too often 
public agencies behave like a hospital that performs surgeries, discharges 
its patient, and declines to provide post-operative monitoring. Upon 
discharge, the patient asks the surgeon, “When do I come back to see 
you?” The surgeon replies, “Never. We have a press release that says we 
removed every malignant cell, we left every bit of healthy tissue in place, 
and you are in great shape.” No responsible hospital practices medicine in 
that manner, and the same should go for competition or consumer 
protection agencies. The measurement of outcomes can be difficult, but 
difficulty does not excuse a failure to try.  
An ex post evaluation program ought to have three basic elements.19 
The first is to test the results of the agency’s substantive initiatives—to 
assess the impact of cases, rules, education programs, and advocacy. 
Agencies can avail themselves of a growing body of experience 
concerning the design of evaluation techniques. Means to this end 
include reviews conducted by agency insiders, consultations with outside 
experts, and peer review exercises performed by representatives from 
other competition authorities.  
The second is to evaluate the agency’s procedures and management 
methods. For example, by measuring the time required for matters to 
progress through the agency’s investigation and decision making 
processes, it may be possible to identify ways to accelerate the disposition 
of individual matters without diminishing the quality of the agency’s 
 19. For a more comprehensive discussion, see William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post 
Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition Policy Authorities, 31 J. CORP. L. 503 
(2006). 
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analysis. 
The third approach is to conduct periodic reviews of the 
institutional framework through which the agency develops and applies 
competition and consumer protection policy. An important element of 
good administrative practice is to embrace a norm that treats periodic 
assessment as an essential foundation for agency improvement. A culture 
that regards routine assessment and refinement has to be built from 
within and not imposed by outsiders. 
One focal point for this type of assessment is the U.S. framework 
for privacy. A review could consider whether the country should take the 
disparate elements of privacy oversight and create a uniform data 
protection regime. Or should the country leave existing industry specific 
and activity specific privacy commands in place and construct a new, 
overarching statute that would cover conduct not subject to existing 
oversight? A third possibility is to rely mainly on the application of 
Section 5 of the FTC Act to fill in the interstices in the system. 
Whatever path is taken, the process of reform should be the result of a 
well-considered deliberative assessment and not merely a quick response 
to crisis. 
CONCLUSION: A REPORT CARD ON GOOD ADMINISTRATIVE 
PRACTICE  
What do we mean when we speak of a competition or consumer 
protection authority as being a “good’ agency? By what standards should 
we measure whether the Federal Trade Commission is performing its 
responsibilities properly with respect to Internet-related issues or other 
matters subject to its oversight? 
One valuable way to measure the FTC or any other public 
regulatory authority is to assess the quality of its institutional 
infrastructure. Good agency performance does not take shape in a 
vacuum. Policy travels across an infrastructure of institutions, and the 
strength of the institutional framework and operational methods 
determines whether agencies can deliver superior policy results.  
The FTC’s self-study identified a number of institutional 
characteristics for successful competition policy and consumer protection 
agencies. Good competition and consumer protection agencies (1) clearly 
and coherently specify their goals, (2) devise and apply a conscious, 
thoughtful mechanism for selecting strategies to attain their aims, (3) 
measure themselves not by the number of cases they prosecute but by 
their capacity to solve problems by recourse to a broad, flexible portfolio 
of policy tools, (4) develop rigorous internal quality control systems, (5) 
invest heavily in building knowledge, increasing human capital, and 
enhancing the infrastructure of information systems, and (6) routinely 
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engage in ex post evaluation exercises to determine how specific 
initiatives turned out and to identify the need for refinements of the 
agency’s analytical approach, statutory powers, and institutional design.  
Doing these things well requires incumbent agency leadership to 
make capital investments whose benefits may come to pass mainly during 
the tenure of future appointees. A telling sign of a good leader is the 
intensity of commitment to take actions today that generate positive 
externalities for one’s successors. For an agency, the aim is to create a 
norm that discourages individual credit-claiming in the short term and 
emphasizes contributions to the long-term success of the institution. 
One person whose ideas helped inform the FTC’s self-study is Fred 
Hilmer, who played a formative role in the modern development of 
Australia’s competition and consumer protection system and now serves 
as the Chancellor of the University of New South Wales. Among other 
duties, Chancellor Hilmer teaches executive MBA classes. He tells his 
students that the success their companies are experiencing today probably 
are rooted in long-term investments that their predecessors made five or 
ten years ago. He advises them, upon returning to their offices, to pose 
the following question to themselves every day: “What have I done to 
make the lives of leaders who follow me better off five or ten years from 
now?” That is good advice for public officials, as well.  
 
